US industry discusses agroterror threat

Although the concept of so-called agroterrorism - referring to the malicious use of biological agents as weapons against the agricultural industry and the food supply chain - is still in its infancy and remains largely hypothetical, it could undermine public confidence in food safety, in addition to costing the US $1 trillion agriculture industry billions of dollars.

One of the main problems facing agroterrorism is that it remains a highly classified area of US governmental policy. Farmers and food companies alike have subsequently been left ill-informed and unable to take action to close vulnerabilities in their existing security arrangements.

Recently a report by the US Government Accountability​ Office suggested that even US government agencies, including the US Department of Agriculture (USDA​), would be inadequately prepared in the event of an agroterrorist attack.

The report concluded that the government would be unable to deploy animal vaccines with 24 hours of an attack and that furthermore, many US veterinarians would not be able to recognise the symptoms of foreign animal diseases.

The three-day conference, to be hosted in Kansas City, US, aims to discuss the development of "a technical and tactical response capability sufficient to neutralise and eliminate a potential attack"​ and will educate the agriculture community on "the role of law enforcement in responding to threats directed at the nation's food supply"​.

Furthermore, it will be attended by representatives from US law enforcement agencies (including FBI Director Robert Mueller), the agriculture and food processing industries, as well as a number of scientific, academic and health industry professionals.

The issue has even been flagged by US President George Bush, who recently said that, "agriculture ranks among the most crucial of our nation's industries; yet its reliability and productivity are often taken for granted".​

Indeed, agroterrorism is considered relatively easy to implement. One US scientist, Professor R. James Cook of Washington State University was quoted as saying it was considered to be "low-tech, high-impact"​, while another, Dr. J. C. Hunter-Cevera of the University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute said it was "very easy to do"​.

But despite these warnings, agroterrorism still remains a relatively low priority on the US government's terrorist threat assessments (particularly as there has not been, as of yet, an attack on US soil).

Hypothetically, terrorists could attack the US food supply chain by destroying crops using natural pests such as the potato beetle Leptinotarsa decemlineata​, or through the use of moulds, plant diseases and chemicals that defoliate vegetation, Agent Orange, for instance - notorious, following its widespread use in the Vietnam War thirty years ago.

Experts have said, however, that crop agroterrorism would be considerably more difficult to implement than its livestock equivalent, mainly because of its dependence on external variables (wind current and temperature, for instance) and its comparatively slow uptake period.

Conversely, contagious animal diseases such as the virulent foot and mouth disease or brucellosis can both be spread without the need for sophisticated delivery technology and to disastrous economic effect - as was proven in the UK several years ago.

Although not believed to be down to terrorist causes, the UK's highly-publicised foot and mouth outbreak of 2001 saw the destruction of 4,047,000 cattle and cost the British farming industry an estimated £2.4 billion (US$4.5 billion).

According to a US government inquiry, a similar repetition of this across the Atlantic could cost the country more than US$33 billion - particularly as the US has more animals at risk (around 9 million dairy heiffers, 33 million beef cattle and 6 million pigs).

Furthermore, an agroterrorist event would inevitably have much higher cost implications than a natural outbreak, as terrorists would behave strategically in order to create maximum damage.